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INTRODUCTION
In the middle of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court retreated
from an assertive role of enforcing economic rights, in which it had
reviewed the reasonableness of economic regulation at both the state and
national levels. At the same time, it largely swore off enforcing the limits of
Congress's enumerated powers. Not long thereafter, the Court began
developing a new role as the primary protector of "personal" rights,
including racial equality, personal privacy, and free speech. Some
commentators dubbed this contrasting stance toward economic rights, on the
one hand, and personal rights, on the other, a "double standard,"' but that
faintly pejorative label has not stopped this basic dichotomy from becoming
the organizing principle of modem, post-New Deal constitutional law.
The double standard reflected changes in the social and political
context in which the Constitution must operate, as well as the evolving
experience of the Court itself as it strove to enforce constitutional
principles. What has changed once, however, can generally change again. I
suggest in this Essay that developments in the modem economy, as well as
the continually evolving imperatives of constitutional doctrine, have been
eroding the conceptual foundations of the double standard for some time.
Last term's decision in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.,2 however, laid bare just
how far that erosion had progressed and how feeble the doctrinal structure
is that remains. Simply put, Sorrell involved a quintessentially economic
regulatory scheme covering activity that happened to be protected speech.
The problem was not so much that the case fell at some fuzzy borderline
between economic and personal rights; rather, Vermont's effort to regulate
the sale of information within the health care market fell solidly within both
the supposedly separate categories of post-New Deal constitutionalism. As
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Symposium on "Constitutional Constraints on State Health Care & Privacy Regulation After Sorrell v.
IMS Health," jointly sponsored by the University of New Hampshire School of Law and Vermont Law
School. I am grateful to those institutions, and especially to my friend John Greabe, for the opportunity
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1. HENRY J. ABRAHAM & BARBARA A. PERRY, FREEDOM AND THE COURT: CIVIL RIGHTS
AND LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES 11 (8th ed. 2003).
2. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
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such, it challenged the viability of the fundamental distinction upon which
much of our constitutional law presently rests.
Sorrell was no sport. Many of the most productive and innovative
industries in our modem economy center around communication-consider
telecommunications and intellectual property, for example. It is thus no
longer possible to classify "free speech" as a personal right separate from
the concerns of "economic regulation." Nor is this the only area of overlap.
Many of the "personal" rights at the forefront of contemporary
constitutional doctrine, including but hardly limited to the right of abortion,
are exercised in areas characterized by extensive and traditional health and
safety regulation. In other words, I submit that even if a strong dichotomy
between the "economic" and the "personal" may have made sense at some
point in our constitutional evolution, this will no longer be a workable
distinction in many contemporary cases. That reality, in turn, poses some
hard questions concerning the role of courts in contemporary society.
This Essay proceeds in four Parts. Part I compares two prominent areas
of litigation concerning the health care system: challenges to state anti-
detailing statutes in Sorrell and similar cases and the Commerce Clause-
based challenges to the national Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(PPACA). While the first set of challenges succeeded in Sorrell, current
conventional wisdom holds that the PPACA challenges will fail. If that is
how it plays out, the reason will have everything to do with the post-New
Deal "double standard" that prefers free speech claims to claims involving
economic rights or our federal structure. I flesh out that double standard in
Part II, developing the dichotomy between economic and structural
principles, on the one hand, and personal rights, on the other, as instances of
the under- and over-enforcement of constitutional principles. Both over-
and under-enforcement, I submit, involve judicial responses to line-drawing
difficulties, but obviously the choice between these two decisional tracks
has major consequences for outcomes.
Part III returns to the Sorrell opinions. Finding the data mining
activities of the plaintiffs to involve protected speech, Justice Kennedy's
majority opinion applied heightened scrutiny to the Vermont law and found
3. As this Essay goes to press, the Supreme Court has just heard argument in the PPACA
cases. By the time the Essay appears, the gentle reader will likely know how it all came out. But whether
or not the predictions ventured here are accurate, the important point is that the current structure of
constitutional doctrine offers grounds for learned commentators to say that the PPACA is an easy case.
See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, On Health Care, Justice Will Prevail, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 7, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/08/opinion/08tribe.html.
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it wanting.4 In dissent, Justice Breyer charged the majority with returning,
in essence, to the bad old days of Lochner v. New York, when the Court
reviewed the reasonableness of economic legislation under a fairly
nondeferential standard.' Unfortunately, Breyer's dissent was better at
showing the commonalities between the majority opinion and Lochner than
it was at explaining why the prohibited activity did not involve protected
expression. The upshot was thus to suggest not so much that the majority
had chosen the wrong category, but rather that the whole distinction
between economic and noneconomic liberty was untenable. Part IV offers
some tentative ideas as to what might replace the double standard if it is
indeed coming to the end of its usefulness as an organizing principle.
I. A TALE OF Two HEALTH CARE CHALLENGES
Health care has come to occupy a central place in our political and
constitutional debates. The signature legislative accomplishment of the first
Obama Administration-the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act-
has engaged public debate like few other issues, and the Supreme Court will
decide this term whether the PPACA is consistent with our Constitution's
limits on national power.' Federal and state efforts to regulate health care
have likewise engendered a broad array of individual-rights claims. These
include arguments that the PPACA's "individual mandate" to buy health
insurance violates individual economic liberty,8 that requiring religious
organizations to provide their employees with health insurance coverage for
contraception violates the Free Exercise Clause,9 and-in Sorrell-that
efforts to reduce costs by regulating marketing activities of drug companies
violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.'o
4. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2659.
5. Id. at 2679 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56-57 (1905).
6. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010) (to be codified in scattered sections of 26, 29, & 42 U.S.C.).
7. See Florida ex rel. Attorney General v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d
1235, 1311 (l lth Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011).
8. See, e.g., Amended Complaint at 24, Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep't of Health &
Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256 (N.D. Fla. 2011) (No. 3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT) ("By requiring and
coercing [individuals] to obtain and maintain such healthcare coverage, the Act deprives them of their
right to be free of unwarranted and unlawful federal government compulsion in violation of the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.").
9. See, e.g., Michelle Bauman, Wide Range of Religious Leaders Testify Against
Contraception Mandate, CATH. NEWS AGENCY (Feb. 16, 2012, 4:12 PM), http://www.catholicnews
agency.com/news/wide-range-of-religious-leaders-testify-against-contraception-mandate/.
10. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2659.
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The conventional wisdom is that the constitutional challenge to the
PPACA will fare rather more poorly than did the First Amendment
challenge in Sorrell." I am less interested in whether that wisdom is
correct-like much conventional wisdom, it probably is-than in what the
contrast between these two health care challenges can tell us about the
contemporary structure of American constitutional law. I begin with the
PPACA, then turn to Sorrell.
A. The Affordable Care Act Cases Under the Commerce Clause
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, enacted by the 11Ith
Congress in 2010, does a lot of different things. Legal controversy has
centered primarily on the Act's "individual mandate," which requires
virtually every American to purchase and maintain a minimum level of
health insurance coverage.12 Plaintiffs, including both state governments
and individuals, have asserted that this mandate exceeds Congress's power
under the Commerce Clause and infringes individual economic liberty
under the Due Process Clause. 3 Some state governments have also
challenged the Act's provisions inducing them to participate in the
administration of the Act in exchange for certain grants of federal funding,
arguing that these provisions are "coercive" under the Spending Clause.14
The challenges have thus far met with mixed results. The U.S. Courts
of Appeal for the Sixth and District of Columbia Circuits have upheld the
law, 5 while a divided panel of the Eleventh Circuit struck down the
individual mandate on Commerce Clause grounds.' 6 As many observers
expected all along, the controversy has now reached the Supreme Court,
which granted certiorari last fall and has just heard arguments as this Essay
goes to press.
Notwithstanding the challengers' ability to persuade a bipartisan
majority of the Eleventh Circuit, the leading lights of American
11. See sources cited infra notes 18-20.
12. PPACA § 5000A(a)-(b)(1), 124 Stat. at 244.
13. See, e.g., Amended Complaint, supra note 8, at 21-24.
14. See, e.g., Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 716 F. Supp.
2d 1120, 1129 (N.D. Fla. 2010) ("The plaintiffs allege that these several provisions violate the
Constitution and state sovereignty by coercing and commandeering the states and depriving them of
their 'historic flexibility' to run their state government, healthcare, and Medicaid programs.")
15. Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 20 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama,
651 F.3d 529, 545 (6th Cir. 2011). The Fourth Circuit dismissed similar challenges on justiciability
grounds. Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253, 269 (4th Cir. 2011).
16. Florida ex rel. Attorney General v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235,
1311 (llth Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011).
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constitutional law have dismissed the PPACA challenges as borderline
frivolous. Laurence Tribe has said that "this law's constitutionality is open
and shut."17 Similarly, Erwin Chemerinsky has insisted that "the federal
health care law is constitutional. It is not even a close question."' Both
men, of course, are leading liberals and partisan Democrats in addition to
being eminent scholars of the Constitution. But a number of conservatives
and moderates have likewise expressed skepticism that the Supreme Court
will, in fact, strike down the PPACA. Charles Fried, for instance, has
asserted that "I have not met any scholars who teach constitutional law and
are members of The Federalist Society who think it's unconstitutional."' 9
That may be an overstatement, as leading conservative scholars like Randy
Barnett and Gary Lawson have, in fact, argued that the PPACA is
unconstitutional. 20 But it seems fair to say that the academic right's support
for the anti-PPACA suits has been muted, at best. My own view, for
whatever it's worth, is that the challenges have a little better shot than
Professor Tribe and Dean Chemerinsky would like to admit, but no prudent
lawyer would bet his 401(k) on their success.2 1
One might fairly ask, however, why so many informed observers doubt
that the challenges will succeed. After all, it seems highly unlikely that the
17. See Tribe, supra note 3. Much of the present author's knowledge of constitutional law,
such as it is, consists in what he learned from Professor Tribe in law school.
18. Erwin Chemerinsky, Political Ideology and Constitutional Decision-Making: The Coming
Example of the Affordable Care Act, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 6),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract= 1952028. Similarly, Andrew Koppelman has pronounced that
"[t]he constitutional objections [to the PPACA] are silly," and that any adverse ruling on the PPACA by
the Court could only be an illegitimately political effort by "the conservative majority on the
Court . .. to crush the most important progressive legislation in decades." Andrew Koppelman, Bad
News for Mail Robbers: The Obvious Constitutionality of Health Care Reform, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE
1, 2 (2011), http://yalelawjournal.org/2011/04/26/koppelman.html.
19. Steve Chapman, Conservative Scholar Says Obamacare Constitutional, ORANGE COUNTY
REG., Apr. 19, 2011, http://www.ocregister.com/articles/-296962--.html.
20. See generally Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the Individual Health
Insurance Mandate Is Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 581 (2010); Gary Lawson & David B.
Kopel, Bad News for Professor Koppelman: The Incidental Unconstitutionality of the Individual
Mandate, 121 YALE L. J. ONLINE 267 (2011), http://yalelawjournal.org/2011/11/08/lawson &kopel.html.
Professor Fried acknowledged that he had, in fact, not only met but taught Randy Barnett-but claimed
to have taught him torts, not constitutional law. See Chapman, supra note 19.
21. Initial reports from the arguments suggest that the conventional wisdom may have been a
bit overconfident. Five Justices expressed considerable skepticism about the Act, see, e.g., Lyle
Denniston, Argument Recap: It Is Kennedy's Call, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 27, 2012, 5:41 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/03/argument-recap-it-is-kennedys-call/, and that alone ought to put to
rest any suggestion that arguments against the individual mandate are "silly," see supra note 18. It is
always risky to predict outcomes based on appearances at oral argument, however, and the PPACA may
well be upheld. Nonetheless, the arguments suggest that constitutional law may be more in flux than we
sometimes think.
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Framers would have envisioned such a broad and intrusive government
program, or that they would have seen health care regulation as the
province of the federal government rather than of the states. It is hard to
find many examples in which the government has required individuals to
participate in a market transaction against their will. And polling data
suggests that the intuitive judgment of the American people is that the
PPACA is unconstitutional.2 2
The problem with the PPACA challenges, I submit, is not that those
challenges lack merit as a matter of pure constitutional meaning. Rather, as
I have argued at greater length elsewhere, the problem is that the relevant
constitutional principles are "underenforced." 2 3 As Larry Sager argued in a
seminal article three decades ago, courts do not always enforce
constitutional principles to their full conceptual limits; rather, they often
craft doctrinal tests that stop short of full enforcement for institutional
reasons.2 4 This has surely occurred with respect to both the federalism and
individual economic liberty challenges to the PPACA. Ever since the New
Deal, courts have doubted their institutional capacity to define the outer
limits of national power or the contours of freedom of contract and other
economic rights. This hardly means that the Constitution does not speak to
these issues or meaningfully limit government power in these areas. But
courts have been extremely unlikely to enforce those limits, instead
deferring to legislative judgments and occasionally suggesting that the
Constitution commits these issues to politics entirely.25
22. A recent USA Today/Gallup poll found that "Americans overwhelmingly believe the
'individual mandate' . . . is unconstitutional, by a margin of 72% to 20%. Even a majority of Democrats,
and a majority of those who think the healthcare law is a good thing, believe that provision is
unconstitutional." Jeffrey M. Jones, Americans Divided on Repeal of2010 Healthcare Law, GALLUP
POLS., Feb. 27, 2012, http://www.gallup.com/poll/152969/Americans-Divided-Repeal-2010-Healthcare-
Law.aspx. The poll was "based on telephone interviews conducted Feb. 20-21, 2012, on the Gallup
Daily tracking survey, with a random sample of 1,040 adults, aged 18 and older, living in all 50 U.S.
states and the District of Columbia." Id.
23. See generally Ernest A. Young, Popular Constitutionalism and the Underenforcement
Problem: The Case of the National Healthcare Law, 75 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 157 (2012).
24. Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional
Norms, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1212, 1213 (1978).
25. See, e.g., Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976).
It is by now well established that legislative Acts adjusting the burdens and benefits
of economic life come to the Court with a presumption of constitutionality, and that
the burden is on one complaining of a due process violation to establish that the
legislature has acted in an arbitrary and irrational way.
Id. (citing Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S.
483, 488 (1955) ("The day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to strike down state laws, regulatory of business and industrial conditions, because they
may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of thought.")).
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Current doctrine thus allows far broader scope to national regulatory
authority than it once did, and it also permits a far greater degree of
intrusion on individual economic choices than did the pre-New Deal law.
The Court's decisions upholding Congress's authority to regulate
homegrown medicinal marijuana consumption nicely illustrates the first
point,26 and a host of decisions applying "rational basis review" to due
process and equal protection challenges to economic regulation demonstrate
the second.27 As a matter of current federalism doctrine, the Court will
likely find that there is an interstate market for health care insurance, and
that individual decisions to purchase or refrain from purchasing insurance-
considered in the aggregate under WickarcP-have a substantial effect on
that market. Likewise, whether or not a decision not to purchase health
insurance represents commercial "activity," a mandate to purchase such
insurance seems rationally related-and thus "necessary and proper" under
current doctrine-to the broader scheme of health insurance regulation in
the PPACA. That is probably enough under the Court's recent Commerce
Clause precedents.
The individual rights argument has similar troubles. The interesting
thing about the health care challenges is that, while typically presented as
federalism arguments about the scope of the Commerce Clause, the
intuitive heart of the objection to the individual mandate sounds in
economic substantive due process.29 What riles people up, in other words, is
being required to purchase a good they don't want-a requirement that
would rankle whether Congress or a state legislature imposed it. The
objection thus rests on principles of due process-a freedom not to contract,
if you will. Moreover, the purpose of the individual mandate is to force
healthy persons who might rationally choose to forego insurance altogether
into the risk pool in order to balance out persons with preexisting
conditions, whom the PPACA requires health insurers to cover at regular
26. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005).
27. See, e.g., FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313-17 (1993) (rejecting, under an
extremely deferential standard, an equal protection challenge to a provision of the Cable
Communications Policy Act of 1984).
28. Wickardv. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28 (1942).
29. 1 have argued elsewhere that there is absolutely nothing wrong with using a federalism
argument to "stand in" for concerns about individual liberties that might not prevail as an independent
claim. See Young, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 23, at 170-72. Part of the point of federalism
is to provide breathing space in which communities with divergent views on the nature and scope of
individual liberty can flourish, subject to a federal floor of basic human rights. See Ann Althouse, The
Vigor of Anti-Commandeering Doctrine in Times of Terror, 69 BROOK. L. REv. 1231 (2004) (arguing
that the anti-commandeering doctrine provides space for individual states and localities to implement
different visions of the balance between security and personal privacy).
9092012]
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rates.30 This is precisely the sort of forced wealth transfer from A to B that
the Court once struck down under the Due Process Clause.31 The current
Court, however, is unlikely to bring back Lochner v. New York,
notwithstanding occasional indications that economic substantive due
process is not entirely dead.32 Under the "rational basis" test that dominates
modem jurisprudence dealing with economic liberty claims, the Court
should have little trouble concluding that Congress has a legitimate interest
in expanding coverage without imposing crippling costs on insurers, or that
the individual mandate is rationally related to that interest.
This is hardly to say that the Court would be right to reject the
challenges to the PPACA. That question implicates difficult issues about
the extent to which current doctrine, reflecting the felt necessities of the
time, should be allowed to trump the original understandings of the
Constitution's text and structure. Nor is it even to say that the Court will
reject the challenges. Current doctrine represents a significant revision of
the Constitution's original understanding-a revision that reflects both
internal incoherences that developed as the Court sought to apply the
original understanding over time, as well as external pressures arising from
economic, social, and political changes in American society. But what has
changed once can change again. To the extent that the broad popular
reaction against "Obamacare" and the associated Tea Party movement
represent a form of popular constitutionalism "outside the courts," those
movements may in time influence the content of Supreme Court doctrine.34
My point is simply that the challenges to the PPACA face a
significantly uphill slog, and that this is because the structure of
contemporary constitutional doctrine has come to disfavor constitutional
30. See, e.g., LAWRENCE R. JACOBS & THEDA SKOCPOL, HEALTH CARE REFORM AND
AMERICAN POLITICS: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 90-91 (2010) (discussing the "adverse
selection" problem).
31. BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 47-48 (1998); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798).
32. See, e.g., E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 503-04 (1998) (striking down a federal
statutory provision imposing retroactive costs on companies that had been in the coal business on a
combination of Takings Clause and due process theories); BMW of N. An., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559,
574 (1996) (striking down a state court punitive damages award as excessive on a substantive due
process theory).
33. See Young, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 23, at 181.
34, See generally BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: How PUBLIC OPINION HAS
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 14 (2009)
("[O]ver time . .. Supreme Court decisions tend to converge with the considered judgment of the
American people."); see also Young, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 23, at 181 (discussing how
popular constitutionalism may impact the constitutionality of the PPACA).
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arguments resting on the limits to national power vis-i-vis the states or on
individual economic liberties. The constitutional battle in Sorrell, on the
other hand, was fought on far different doctrinal terrain.
B. Sorrell and the First Amendment
The law of free speech is quite different from that concerning
federalism and economic liberty. Although the text of the Constitution does
not identify certain provisions as more important than others, the Supreme
Court has long held that the "freedom of speech" is "in a preferred
position."35 Judicial review of governmental action challenged as abridging
the freedom of speech takes place under demanding doctrinal tests.
Content-based regulation gets strict scrutiny.36 Regulation that discriminates
among viewpoints or speakers may be subject to even stricter review.3 ' And
even "lesser" forms of free speech review-for content-neutral regulations
or restrictions on "low value" speech-are considerably more demanding
than the "rational basis review" that governs most economic liberty claims
and informs the Court's construction of the Commerce Clause.
Not surprisingly, these speech doctrines spelled defeat for the Vermont
regulation in Sorrell. That case, as the other contributions to this
Symposium spell out in greater detail, involved a challenge to Vermont's
"Prescription Confidentiality Law" (also known as Act 80), which aimed to
prevent the practice of "detailing" by pharmaceutical manufacturers.39
"Detailing" involves highly targeted marketing of drugs to doctors by drug
salesman, who rely heavily on "prescriber-identifying information"
indicating the prescribing practices of the doctors they service. 4 0 Drug
companies obtain this information from "data miners," who in turn derive it
from purchasing information obtained from pharmacies that sell
prescription drugs.4 1 Detailing generally promotes "high-profit, brand-name
drugs"; Vermont (and several other New England states) thus sought to
35. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943). But see Sanford Levinson & Ernest
A. Young, Who's Afraid of the Twelfth Amendment?, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 925, 943-44 (2001)
(wondering why some constitutional provisions are "more equal than others").
36. United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000).
37. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391-96 (1992).
38. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 264, 1017 (4th
ed. 2011).
39. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4631 (Supp. 2011).
40. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2659-60 (2011).
41. Id. at 2660.
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limit the practice as a means of containing health care costs.42 Act 80 thus
barred pharmacies and other entities from selling prescriber-identifying
information and prohibited drug companies from using such information for
marketing without the consent of the prescribing doctor.43 Sorrell involved
two consolidated suits, one by data miners and the other by an association
of pharmaceutical manufacturers, which both alleged that Act 80 violated
their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments."
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion began its analysis by observing
that "[o]n its face, Vermont's law enacts content- and speaker-based
restrictions on the sale, disclosure, and use of prescriber-identifying
information."4A The measure "has the effect of preventing detailers-and
only detailers-from communicating with physicians in an effective and
informative manner. ,6 Noting that "Act 80 is designed to impose a
specific, content-based burden on protected expression," Kennedy
concluded that "[i]t follows that heightened judicial scrutiny is
warranted."47 The Court rejected the First Circuit's conclusion, in a similar
case arising in New Hampshire, that prescriber-identifying information was
a commodity with no more First Amendment protection than "beef jerky,""
noting that "[t]his Court has held that the creation and dissemination of
information are speech within the meaning of the First Amendment." 4 9
The majority equivocated, however, on the appropriate standard of
review. Explaining that "[i]n the ordinary case it is all but dispositive to
conclude that a law is content-based and, in practice, viewpoint-
discriminatory,"so Justice Kennedy said that "the outcome is the same
whether a special commercial speech inquiry or a stricter form of judicial
scrutiny is applied."51 The Court thus avoided any need "to determine
whether all speech hampered by § 4631(d) is commercial, as our cases have
used that term."5 2 Applying an intermediate-scrutiny commercial-speech
42. See id. at 2659-60, 2670 (noting Vermont's contention that section 4631(d) "advances
important public policy goals by lowering the costs of medical services and promoting public health").
43. tit. 18, § 4631(d).
44. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2661.
45. Id. at 2663.
46. Id
47. Id at 2664.
48. See id. at 2666 (quoting and discussing IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42, 52-53 (1st
Cir. 2008)).
49. Id. at 2667 (citing Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 527 (2001); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.,
514 U.S. 476,481 (1995); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 759 (1985)).
50. Id. (citing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382, 391-92 (1992)).
51. Id (citing Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 184 (1999)).
52. Id. at 2667 (citing Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 474 (1989)).
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test-"the State must show at least that the statute directly advances a
substantial governmental interest and that the measure is drawn to achieve
that interest" 53 -the Court found Act 80 lacking. It rejected Vermont's
interest in physician privacy, noting that the state permitted the information
to be used for purposes other than detailing.54 And it found that Act 80
failed to advance Vermont's interest in lowering health care costs "in a
permissible way."ss That interest, after all, rested on the likelihood that
speech by detailers would persuade its audience: "If pharmaceutical
marketing affects treatment decisions, it does so because doctors find it
persuasive. Absent circumstances far from those presented here, the fear
that speech might persuade provides no lawful basis for quieting it."5 6
Justice Breyer dissented, arguing that the Vermont law's effect on
speech "is inextricably related to a lawful governmental effort to regulate a
commercial enterprise."57 He, too, was somewhat ambiguous about the
appropriate standard of review, arguing that "[t]he First Amendment does
not require courts to apply a special 'heightened' standard of review when
reviewing such an effort."58 But Breyer also seemed to accept existing
commercial-speech doctrine that imposed on the government a burden
considerably greater than traditional "rational basis" review. 9 Concluding
that "[t]he statute threatens only modest harm to commercial speech" and
that "[t]he legitimate state interests that the statute serves are
'substantial,"' 6 0 Breyer argued that those interests-in protecting privacy
and reducing costs-could not be furthered by less restrictive regulation.
Moreover, the dissenters worried that "the Court opens a Pandora's Box of
First Amendment challenges to many ordinary regulatory practices that may
only incidentally affect a commercial message." 6 2
Certainly Justice Kennedy's citation to Board of Trustees of the State University of New York v. Fox,
492 U.S. at 474, for the proposition that when "pure speech and commercial speech were inextricably
intertwined,... the entirety must... be classified as noncommercial," 131 S. Ct. at 2667 (internal
quotation marks omitted), suggested that Kennedy thought the higher standard should most likely apply.
53. Id. at 2667-68 (citing Fox, 492 U.S. at 480-81; Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)).
54. Id. at 2668.
55. Id. at 2670.
56. Id. at 2670 (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,447 (1969) (per curiam)).
57. Id. at 2673 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justices Ginsburg and Kagan joined Justice Breyer's
dissent. Id.
58. Id
59. See id. at 2679-84 (applying the Central Hudson test).
60. Id at 2680-81 (quoting Central Hudson, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980)).
61. Id. at 2683-84.
62. Id. at 2684. They were right. See infra note 111 and accompanying text.
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The contrast with the PPACA litigation could hardly be more stark.
Both Congress and the Vermont legislature enacted recent legislation
seeking to address the high cost of health care in contemporary America.
Congress's legislation, challenged under principles of federalism and
economic liberty, seems highly likely to survive because it will be judged
under lenient doctrinal tests that defer to judgments by the political
branches. Vermont's measure, on the other hand, went down under far more
demanding doctrines that protect free speech. This juxtaposition raises the
question whether the distinction between federalism and economic liberty,
on the one hand, and personal rights like free speech, on the other, can be
justified or sustained.
II. THE "DOUBLE STANDARD" AND THE STRUCTURE OF MODERN
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Henry Abraham famously described the structure of constitutional
doctrine after the New Deal as embodying "a 'double standard' of judicial
attitude, whereby governmental economic experimentation is accorded
close to carte blanche by the courts, but alleged violations of individual
civil rights and liberties are given meticulous judicial attention." 63 This
"double standard" represents the enduring fallout from the backlash against
Lochner-era judicial activism. Prior to the New Deal, the Supreme Court
aggressively enforced federalism-based limits on national power as well as
principles of individual economic liberty under the Due Process Clause. 4
As the national regulatory state expanded to meet the challenge of the
Depression, the Court's stance put it on a collision course with the national
political branches. Although President Roosevelt's plan to overturn
Lochner-era resistance to national regulation by packing the Court failed,
the Court largely capitulated by abandoning its constitutional opposition to
the New Deal.65 The post-New Deal Court found a new role, however, by
enforcing various aspects of noneconomic individual liberty, such as racial
equality, free speech and privacy, and the rights of criminal defendants.
63. ABRAHAM & PERRY, supra note 1, at 11.
64. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (holding a maximum-hour law
unconstitutional); see also Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Hammer v. Dagenhart,
247 U.S. 251 (1918); United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
65. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937); see also FRIEDMAN,
supra note 34, at 205-36; W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
66. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see
also FRIEDMAN, supra note 34, at 237-79.
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The Court prefigured this divide in United States v. Carolene Products
Co.'s famous "Footnote Four," prescribing a deferential standard of review
of economic regulation while reserving stricter scrutiny for textual rights
provisions, regulation affecting the political process, and discrimination
against "discrete and insular minorities."
There are complications to this canonical story. Lochner-era activism was
not as categorical as is sometimes supposed; the Court upheld at least as many
statutes as it struck down in both the Commerce Clause and freedom of contract
contexts. 8 Its efforts to limit national power hardly redounded to the benefit of
the states, because the Court's freedom of contract and dormant Commerce
Clause jurisprudence sharply limited state regulatory experimentation as well.69
The internal contradictions of the Court's Commerce Clause and freedom of
contract jurisprudence may have been as important a cause of the Court's
famous "switch in time" as the external threat posed by court-packing.70 And
scholars have questioned whether the post-New Deal revival of judicial review
in civil liberties cases really tracks the lines laid out in Carolene Products.7' But
none of these complications undermine the basic point, which is that the
Supreme Court retreated from judicial activism in certain constitutional areas
and diverted its energies into other constitutional fields, and that this
redirection-undertaken largely for institutional reasons-fundamentally
determines the structure of contemporary constitutional doctrine.
While most observers seem to agree that the double standard exists, it
is considerably more difficult to define its content with any sort of
precision. Lynn Baker and I have examined this problem in more detail
elsewhere; 72 for present purposes a sketch of the basic issues will suffice.
67. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); see also JOHN HART
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 75-77 (1980) (explaining the
Warren Court's jurisprudence in terms of Footnote Four).
68. See, e.g., CUSHMAN, supra note 31, at 33-34 (cataloguing a series of 1930s Supreme Court
cases upholding various statutes).
69. See Stephen Gardbaum, New Deal Constitutionalism and the Unshackling of the States, 64
U. CHI. L. REv. 483, 488-89 (1997) (explaining that, prior to 1938, the doctrine of substantive due
process and the dormant Commerce Clause were "wielded extremely aggressively against the states").
70. Compare, e.g., ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 117 (3d ed.
2000) (ascribing the switch in the Court's stance to a combination of FDR's sweeping 1936 electoral
victory, the outbreak of a new wave of labor disputes, and the court-packing plan), with CUSHMAN,
supra note 31, at 6 (arguing that the conventional account overlooks the critical role of doctrinal
developments, internal to the law, that made the pre-1937 jurisprudence unsustainable).
71. See, e.g., LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 487-89 (2000).
72. Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial
Review, 51 DUKE L.J. 75, 80-85 (2001).
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Here are the constitutional principles that the Court largely stopped
enforcing after 1937:
* freedom of contract and other economic liberties under
the Due Process Clause;73
* the Contracts Clause, especially as it bears on state
action impairing contracts between private parties; 74
* dormant Commerce Clause review of state laws that
burden interstate commerce but do not discriminate
between in-staters and out-of-staters;75
* federalism-based limits on Congress's commerce and
spending power;76 and
* the nondelegation doctrine, which once prohibited
Congress from delegating lawmaking powers to federal
*77
agencies.
On the other hand, after an initial retreat from activism altogether, the post-
New Deal Court gradually regained its confidence and considerably
expanded judicial review in other constitutional areas. These include:
* racial equality under the Equal Protection Clause, as
well as protection for other "discrete and insular
minorities" and for women;
73. See Williams v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955) (rejecting a
freedom of contract challenge to an Oklahoma law); see also Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
74. See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 447 (1934).
75. See David S. Day, Revisiting Pike: The Origins of the Nondiscrimination Tier of the
Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 27 HAMLINE L. REV. 45, 49 (2004) (observing that "no Supreme
Court decision has been based upon the undue burden standard since the Court's 1988 Term" and
concluding that "the nondiscrimination standard has fallen into some disuse").
76. See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971) (upholding Congress's power to
regulate "purely intrastate" extortion, an activity traditionally within state police powers, because it
affects "interstate commerce"); see also Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241
(1964); Baker & Young, supra note 72, at 87 (discussing the Court's justification for refusing to narrow
Congress's commerce power "in terms of institutional concerns about judicial competence").
77. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 475-76 (2001) (holding that the
EPA's duty to establish ambient air quality criteria under the Clean Air Act did not violate the non-
delegation doctrine); see also Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160 (1991).
78. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (race); Miss. Univ. for Women
v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 729-30 (1982) (gender); Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 99-101 (1982)
(illegitimacy).
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* unenumerated rights to privacy, especially in the area
of family and reproductive rights;79
* free speech, expanded to include a wide range of
expressive conduct and to eliminate most previously
unprotected forms of "low value" speech;80
* rights to religious liberty, especially against
government subsidies to and endorsement of religious
belief and practice;81
* the criminal procedure rights of the accused and limits
on sentences imposed on those convicted; 82
* extensive intervention in the political process under the
Equal Protection Clause and the First Amendment;83
* separation-of-powers limits on executive authorit and
congressional efforts to alter the legislative process; and
79. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965); see also Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558 (2003); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
80. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 396 (1992) (holding that an ordinance
prohibiting bias-motivated disorderly conduct was impermissible content-based discrimination because
it targeted a limited group); see also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
81. Compare Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 690
(1994), and Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992), and Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), with
Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990) (relegating many, if not most, Free Exercise Clause
challenges to rational basis review).
82. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (holding unconstitutional the imposition of
the death penalty on offenders who were under the age of eighteen when their crimes were committed); see
also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
83. See generally Richard H. Pildes, The Supreme Court, 2003 Term-Foreword: The
Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 28 (2004). See also Cal. Democratic
Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
84. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 594-95, 612 (2006) (holding that the
President's power to establish military commissions is bounded by "congressional authorization");
Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 421 (1998) (holding that the Line Item Veto violated the
Presentment Clause); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983) (holding that the legislative veto
violated the separation of powers); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 588-89
(1952) (holding the President's seizure of privately owned factories unconstitutional); see also United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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* rigorous dormant Commerce Clause review of state
legislation that discriminates against out-of-staters.85
This list should help to clarify what the dividing line is not: For example,
the distinction is not between individual liberties and structural principles,
because the Court has largely abandoned individual freedom of contract as
an individual liberty while continuing to enforce the structural principle of
separation of powers. The Court does not draw a line between
unenumerated and enumerated constitutional principles, because it
generally does not enforce the Contracts Clause while recognizing
unenumerated rights to privacy. And the Court does not restrict its
interventions to those necessary to protect politically powerless
minorities-after all, large majorities favor contraception and corporations
are extremely powerful speakers, while religious minorities retain little
protection and aspects of Establishment Clause doctrine actually work to
their detriment."
The most likely account is simply that the Court stopped doing what it
was doing when it got in trouble back in the 1930s. No organizing principle
will perfectly reflect that reality, but the best candidate is probably some
basic distinction between "economic" and "social or personal" rights. As
Robert McCloskey has written, the double standard "was never really
thought through. It seems to have been a kind of reflex, arising out of
indignation against the excesses of the Old Court, and resting on the vague,
uncritical idea that 'personal rights' are 'O.K.' but economic rights are 'Not
O.K."'88 This way of defining the double standard has several weaknesses.
First, economic choices are often deeply personal. The choice of an
occupation, for example, is an economic choice, but it is also one of the
most basic efforts at self-definition that individuals undertake. Second, the
Court has not uniformly deferred to government regulation of the economy;
85. See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 572 (1997)
(striking a real-estate tax scheme under the dormant Commerce Clause); see also Fulton Corp. v.
Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325 (1996); C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994); City
of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
86. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (striking down Connecticut's ban
on contraceptives); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 767 (1978) (striking down a
Massachusetts restriction on the free speech of corporations).
87. See Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990) (holding that minority religious
practices may generally be restricted so long as those restrictions are generally applicable); Bd. of Educ.
v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 690 (1994) (striking down a state legislature's effort to accommodate a
religious minority under the Establishment Clause).
88. Robert G. McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and
Reburial, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 34, 54.
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for example, it continues to rigorously review state economic legislation
under the dormant Commerce and Supremacy Clauses.89 And, finally, the
economic/personal divide does not really capture the distinctions drawn on
the structural side, such as the current underenforcement of federalism and
the Court's comparatively greater vigilance in separation of powers. 90
Nonetheless, the economic/personal distinction has both a great deal of
descriptive power and, perhaps more important, a ready grounding in the
New Deal battles from which the double standard arose. The test of wills
between the Court and FDR had to do with economic regulation, and it is
not surprising that the Court's retreat has been most dramatic in this area.
The Court's enthusiasm for personal rights, moreover, has been deployed
primarily at the expense of the states, allowing the Court largely to avoid
further confrontations with the President or Congress.91 When the Court has
confronted the national political branches in separation-of-powers cases, it
has tended to be in contexts that are relatively low visibility,92 that enable
the Court to play one branch off against the other,93 or that allow the Court
to make a stand for constitutional principle while still allowing the political
branches to get much of what they want as a practical matter.9 4
89. On the dormant Commerce Clause, see cases cited supra note 85. On preemption, see, e.g.,
PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2572 (2011) (holding that manufacturers of generic drugs
cannot be sued for failure to warn because such claims are preempted by federal law); Watters v.
Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1 (2007). See generally Ernest A. Young, "The Ordinary Diet of the
Law": The Presumption Against Preemption in the Roberts Court, 2011 Sup. CT, REV. 1.
90. On the underenforcement of federalism, see, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 9 (2005)
(holding that, under the Commerce Clause, Congress can criminalize medicinal marijuana use despite a
legal classification under state law); Young, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 23, at 159. On
separation of powers, see cases cited supra note 84, as well as Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co.
Accounting Oversight Board, 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010), Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008), and
Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995).
91. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 413 (2008) (striking down a state law
imposing the death penalty for a non-homicide offense and ignoring a similar provision in federal law),
modified on denial ofreh'g, 129 S. Ct. 1 (2008); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996) (striking
down a Colorado constitutional amendment forbidding localities from providing antidiscrimination
protection for homosexuals); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-66 (1973) (striking down Texas and
Georgia abortion laws). See generally POWE, supra note 71, at 486-87 (arguing that the Warren Court's
decisions were primarily directed toward imposing national norms on recalcitrant states in the South).
92. See, e.g., Free Enterprise Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3151-52 (striking down provisions protecting
members of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board from presidential removal); Clinton v.
City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 421 (1998) (striking down the line-item veto); Plaut, 514 U.S. at 240
(striking down a federal statute reopening final federal judgments as a violation of Article III).
93. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 588-89 (1952) (holding
that President Truman lacked constitutional authority to seize the steel mills without authorization by
Congress); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983) (striking down the legislative veto).
94. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 594-95, 612 (2006) (holding that the
President could not establish military commissions to try suspected terrorists without congressional
9192012]
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It is important to underscore, however, that the double standard is a
creature of Supreme Court doctrine, not an inherent quality of the
Constitution. For much of our history, the Court vigorously enforced
economic rights and federalism while doing little to protect "personal"
rights like free speech, religious liberty, or the rights of the accused. 95 The
vigor with which judge-made doctrine enforces particular constitutional
principles is thus historically contingent, and it changes over time. The
question is whether it is about to change again.
III. SORRELL's ASSAULT ON THE DOUBLE STANDARD
Justice Breyer's dissent in Sorrell explicitly invoked the post-New
Deal double standard and the danger of returning to an older jurisprudence
that would more closely scrutinize economic regulations.96 For him,
Vermont's Act 80 was an ordinary regulatory statute, addressing one of the
principal economic problems of our age, with a merely "incidental" impact
on free speech.97 For "ordinary commercial or regulatory legislation that
affects speech in less direct ways," he wrote, "the Court has taken account
of the need .. . to defer significantly to legislative judgment-as the Court
has done in cases involving the Commerce Clause or the Due Process
Clause."9 He cited two of the classic cases abandoning vigorous review of
economic regulation and articulating a "rational basis review" involving
virtually complete deference to the political branches-Williamson v. Lee
Optical9 and United States v. Carolene Products Co. 0 0-and strongly
suggested that this was the appropriate standard of review in Sorrell.'o And
he warned that "given the sheer quantity of regulatory initiatives that touch
upon commercial messages, the Court's vision of its reviewing task
threatens to return us to a happily bygone era when judges scrutinized
authorization, but leaving open the possibility that Congress could enact a new statute authorizing such
commissions); Stem v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2611 (2011) (holding that Article III prohibited
allowing bankruptcy judges from entering final judgments on state law counterclaims but leaving open
various possibilities by which Article III might be satisfied with relatively minor changes to the
bankruptcy system); see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 180 (1803) (striking down a
provision of the 1789 Judiciary Act but avoiding issuing an order that the political branches might defy).
95. See Young, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 23, at 183, 186.
96. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2675, 2679 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 2681-85.
98. Id at 2674-75 (citing Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc., 521 U.S. 457,475-76 (1997)).
99. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955).
100. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938).
101. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2675 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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legislation for its interference with economic liberty."' 02 Noting that
"[h]istory shows that the power was much abused and resulted in the
constitutionalization of economic theories preferred by individual jurists,"
he concluded that "today's majority risks repeating the mistakes of the
past."' 03 Justice Breyer, in other words, cried "Lochner!"
This is an important accusation, because speech is not a narrow
category. Consider how many leading sectors of the economy are built
around activities that, because they involve expression and the
dissemination of information, would qualify for First Amendment
protection-industries such as telecommunications, social networking,
software development, both nonprofit and for-profit education, financial
trading and advising, and legal services. A decade ago, Daniel Bell
contrasted "industrial society .. . based on a labor theory of value" with "[a]
post-industrial society [that] rests on a knowledge theory of value."'N It is
simply no longer possible to imagine a sphere of economic activity in
which the government has largely free regulatory rein and a more protected
sphere of personal activity in which First Amendment activities take place.
More and more, the critical economic industries that government must
regulate will involve potentially protected expression and information
flows.
From this perspective, the most striking thing about Sorrell is not
simply the plausibility of Justice Breyer's accusation that the Court was
interfering with ordinary governmental regulatory policies, but also how
such interference arose out of a perfectly straightforward application of
traditional First Amendment principles. It is tempting to say, as the First
Circuit did in Ayotte, that state restrictions on data-mining prescription
information do not implicate speech at all. But the Court was surely right
that the disclosure of raw information is a critical aspect of protected
expression. Consider, for example, the famous Pentagon Papers case, which
likewise involved the right to disclose information. 0 5 And Justice Kennedy
102. Id at 2679.
103. Id
104. DANIEL BELL, THE COMING OF POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY: A VENTURE IN SOCIAL
FORECASTING, at xvii (1999); see also id. (observing that while "[t]he infrastructure of industrial society
was transportation ... [t]he infrastructure of post-industrial society is communication"). Some argue that
information flows will come to be critical even to traditional production industries. See, e.g., Mary
Adams, The Post-Industrial Production Economy, MANDEL ON INNOVATION AND GROWTH (Oct. 21,
2011), http://innovationandgrowth.wordpress.com/2011/10/21/the-post-industrial-production-economy/
("[W]e can expect that every corner of the economy, including the production sector, will be
'knowledge-ized,' that is, re-made using information technology and knowledge to drive efficiencies.").
105. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971).
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was able to cite numerous more mundane cases recognizing that prosaic
forms of information amount to protected speech.'
Once the regulated activity is speech, then heightened scrutiny follows
almost as night follows the day. As Justice Kennedy observed, Vermont's
regulation "imposes more than an incidental burden on protected
expression," in the way that "'an ordinance against outdoor fires' might
forbid 'burning a flag."' 1 0 7 Because the regulation turned on the content of
the speech, and seemed indeed to be directed at some speakers but not
others, strict scrutiny followed under well-established precedents. But it is
also true, as Justice Breyer pointed out, that "[r]egulatory programs
necessarily draw distinctions on the basis of content," and it is also
commonplace for economic regulations "to be 'speaker-based,' affecting
only a class of entities, namely, the regulated firms."'0o For example,
federal law extensively regulates the content of drug labels, often requiring
governmental approval of the content of those labels and forbidding
reference to unapproved uses of the drug.'09 Many of those regulations,
moreover, are speaker-based; generic-drug manufacturers have different
obligations than brand-name manufacturers, for instance."o Pharmaceutical
companies have already filed First Amendment challenges to some of these
requirements in Sorrell's wake."'
One might instead say that the Court erred in treating the speech in
Sorrell as ordinary noncommercial speech, rather than as commercial
speech triggering a lesser degree of First Amendment scrutiny. This
approach would attempt to replicate the post-1937 double standard within
First Amendment doctrine, according the strictest scrutiny to restrictions on
political or personal speech while treating commercial speech regulation
more deferentially." 2 It is not obvious that this can or should be done, as
106. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2667 (citing Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 481 (1995)
(recognizing that "information on beer labels" is speech); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders,
Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 759 (1985) (plurality opinion) (recognizing that a credit report is "speech")).
107. Id at 2665 (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 385 (1992)).
108. Id at 2677-78 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S 748, 761 (1976)).
109. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 352(f)(2), 355(b)(1), 355(d) (2006); see also Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2676
(discussing these requirements).
110. See PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2574 (2011) (describing the generic drug
labeling regime).
111. See Thomas Sullivan, Par Pharmaceuticals vs. FDA Calling for Truthful Speech vs. FDA
Approved, POL'Y & MED. (Oct. 18, 2011), http://www.policymed.com/201 1/10/phar-pharmaceuticals-
vs-fda-calling-for-truthful-speech-vs-fda-approved.html (analyzing the legal merits of a recent challenge
to the FDA's prohibition against "off-label promotion").
112. See, e.g., Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2673-74 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[T]he First Amendment
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many Justices and commentators have criticized the doctrinal distinction
between commercial and noncommercial speech."'3 Nor is it clear where
such a divide would leave the large proportion of speech cases that do not
involve outright political speech but have not been treated as commercial
either, such as the Court's recent cases on broadcast indecency,1 4 animal
"crush" videos,"' and violent video games.116 But even if we accept a sharp
distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech, and put Sorrell
on the commercial side of the line, that would not solve the more
fundamental problem that the case presents.
Justice Kennedy seemed to prefer a more demanding level of scrutiny
for content-based restrictions, even in commercial cases, and Justice Breyer
argued for something closer to rational basis review, but both the majority
and the dissent in Sorrell purported to apply arguendo the standard test for
regulation of commercial speech established in Central Hudson Gas &
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York."1 That test
inquires whether (1) the commercial speech at issue "is neither misleading
nor related to unlawful activity"; (2) the government's interest is
"substantial"; (3) "the restriction . . . directly advance[s] the state interest";
and (4) "the governmental interest could be served as well by a more
limited restriction on commercial speech.""'8 Both majority and dissent
treated this as a form of "intermediate" scrutiny.119 As such, it is already a
far cry from the "rational basis" review that has characterized constitutional
review on the deferential side of the modern double standard. Lochner itself
applied a form of intermediate scrutiny, inquiring whether a law restricting
freedom of contract was "a fair, reasonable and appropriate exercise of the
police power of the State, or is it an unreasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary
imposes tight constraints upon government efforts to restrict, e.g., 'core' political speech, while
imposing looser constraints when the government seeks to restrict, e.g., commercial speech, the speech
of its own employees, or the regulation-related speech of a firm subject to a traditional regulatory
program.").
113. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 520, 522 (1996) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and in the judgment) (noting "the near impossibility of severing 'commercial' speech
from speech necessary to democratic decisionmaking" and concluding that "I do not see a philosophical
or historical basis for asserting that 'commercial' speech is of 'lower value' than 'noncommercial'
speech").
114. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 3065, 3065-66 (2011) (granting certiorari
to decide "[w]hether the Federal Communications Commission's current indecency-enforcement regime
violates the First or Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution").
115. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1592 (2010).
116. Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2742 (2011).
117. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2667-68; id. at 2679 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
118. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980).
119. See Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2667-68; id. at 2679 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
9232012]
HeinOnline  -- 36 Vt. L. Rev. 923 2011-2012
Vermont Law Review
interference with the right of the individual to his personal liberty or to
enter into ... contracts."1 2 0 As Barry Cushman has demonstrated, the
Lochner freedom of contract jurisprudence upheld at least as many
regulations as it struck down.121
Applying a different First Amendment standard, in other words, would
hardly make a dent in the criticism that judicial review is likely to disrupt
important governmental regulatory schemes. All forms of speech review-
including the Central Hudson test-are far less deferential than the
"rational basis" review of economic legislation that replaced Lochner's
reasonableness test. Perhaps the only solution, then, is to adopt Justice
Breyer's suggestion that cases like Sorrell should be judged under the same
rational basis standard that now applies in economic due process litigation.
But this is hardly satisfactory, because Breyer offered little explanation as
to when rational basis review should supplant ordinary First Amendment
doctrine. He suggested that "[t]he Court has also normally applied a yet
more lenient approach to ordinary commercial or regulatory legislation that
affects speech in less direct ways" than restrictions on advertising.122 That
suggestion, however, brings back bad memories of the direct/indirect
distinction that once organized the Court's Lochner-era Commerce Clause
jurisprudence.'2 3 Breyer's other grounds for applying more deferential
scrutiny-for example, that the federal government and other states
undertake similar regulatory actions, that the Vermont law is part of a
"comprehensive regulatory regime," and that the regulated information
"exists only by virtue of government regulation"l2-Were so fact-intensive
as to amount to a gestalt judgment with little constraining force in future
cases.
More fundamentally, if expressive activity is really ubiquitous in the
modern information economy, then there is no escaping the basic dilemma
Sorrell poses. If much economic regulation is also speech regulation, then
the Court must either fundamentally narrow First Amendment doctrine to
allow application of traditional rational basis review to economic regulation
of speech or reintroduce meaningful judicial scrutiny into a large swath of
regulatory activity. It cannot honestly resolve cases like Sorrell by applying
120. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905); see id. at 54 (noting that the Court's
freedom of contract jurisprudence had "been guided by rules of a very liberal nature, the application of
which has resulted, in numerous instances, in upholding the validity of state statutes thus assailed").
121. See CUSHMAN, supra note 31, at 33-34.
122. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2674 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
123. See, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1895) (distinguishing state
laws that directly interfere with interstate commerce from those only indirectly affecting it).
124. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2676 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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the customary doctrinal double standard, because the regulations in such
cases will fit comfortably on both sides of the line.
Nor can the dilemma be confined to the First Amendment. Recent
years have seen increasingly frequent collision between other "personal"
rights and traditional forms of economic regulation. Federal health care
rules mandating that employers provide coverage for contraception and
employment rules forbidding discrimination on grounds like disability, for
example, have come into conflict with the rights of religious groups under
the Free Exercise Clause. 125 Regulation of health care and medical ethics
also collides with various aspects of privacy under the Due Process
Clause.12 6 Like other ill-fated judicial attempts to divide up the world into
distinct "spheres" of activity, the effort to cabin heightened judicial scrutiny
into a "personal" sphere while giving the government free play on
"economic" matters is likely to fail across the board.
This problem is not altogether new. In Turner Broadcasting System, Inc.
v. FCC, for example, the Court strained to find that the Federal
Communications Commission's "must carry" rules for cable service
providers were subject only to intermediate scrutiny because they were
content neutral, notwithstanding that they required cable providers to carry
certain content. 12 7 The Court's embrace of intermediate scrutiny might be
more plausibly explained as a recognition that cable regulation is economic
regulation, so that application of strict First Amendment scrutiny would
disrupt precisely the sorts of government policies that the double standard
was erected to protect. Of course, the solution is only partially satisfactory
because intermediate scrutiny under Turner, like the Central Hudson test, is
still far more intrusive than ordinary rational basis review. The important
point is simply that the double standard has been eroding for some time in the
First Amendment area, and that erosion is only going to get worse as
expression and information become increasingly central to our economic life.
I do not profess to have a solution to this dilemma. The doctrinal
double standard came into being for good reasons-a desire to avoid
repeating the excessive judicial intervention of the Lochner era, combined
with a recognition that full judicial abdication would undermine our
125. See, e.g., Complaint at 1-2, Priests for Life v. Sebelius, No. 1:12-cv-00753 (E.D.N.Y. filed
Feb. 15, 2012) (challenging the PPACA's mandate that all employers must provide contraception in
their health insurance plans); Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct.
694, 705-06 (2012) (holding that religious institutions enjoy a "ministerial exception" from the
Americans with Disabilities Act).
126. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 705 (1997) (considering claims that the
Due Process Clause protects a privacy right to physician-assisted suicide).
127. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 643-44 (1994).
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national commitment to constitutionalism. It seems clear that the tension
between those two imperatives can no longer be resolved simply by
assigning them to different spheres of governmental activity. We need a set
of doctrinal rules that are not tied to unsustainable distinctions-but also a
set of rules that does not abandon judicial checks on arbitrary action by
political actors.128 But it is infinitely easier to say that than it is to articulate
what those rules should be.
One possibility would be to build on the "undue burden" standard that
the Court has adopted in abortion cases.12 9 Strict scrutiny-the primary
doctrinal standard for analyzing regulation of fundamental personal
rights-proceeds on the assumption that most such regulation is pernicious
and should be struck down, with only rare exceptions.130 But some rights,
such as rights to make meaningful choices about reproduction and medical
care, require certain forms of regulation in order to further their exercise.
The Court has thus been unwilling to adopt strict scrutiny as the standard
for evaluating restrictions on physician-assisted suicide, for example;' 3'
even those who favor making that choice available would generally concede
that it requires extensive regulatory safeguards to ensure that choices are
voluntary and methods are humane. Similarly, abortion is not a meaningful
choice unless it is medically safe, and safety requires some degree of
regulation.132 The Court has thus abandoned strict scrutiny of abortion
regulations in favor of the undue burden standard, which is designed to
distinguish between regulation that furthers the underlying right and
128. Professor Tribe has argued, for example, that while the Lochner Court erred by painting the
wrong "picture of freedom in industrial society," "there is no escape from the difficult task of painting a
better.. . truer picture; to leave the canvas blank just hands the brushes over to other artists." LAURENCE
H. TRIBE, 1 AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 8-9, at 1371 (3d ed. 2000). In other words, courts
cannot entirely abdicate defining and enforcing principles of substantive liberty under the Due Process
Clause.
129. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992) (plurality opinion)
("A finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose
or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable
fetus.").
130. See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, Post-Liberal Judging: The Roles of Categorization
and Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L. REv. 293, 296 (1992) ("If strict scrutiny is applied, the challenged law is
never supposed to survive .... Hence Professor Gerald Gunther's pithy aphorism: "'strict' in theory and
fatal in fact." ) (quoting Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972)).
131. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 705.
132. More controversially, some regulations also proceed on the principle that abortion is not a
meaningful choice unless it is sufficiently informed by knowledge about its consequences.
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regulation that, while perhaps disguised as helpful, is actually meant to
discourage that right. 33
This sort of right-that is, one requiring a certain degree of regulation
for its meaningful vindication-seems pervasive in contemporary society.
The theory of modem campaign-finance regulation, for example, is that
political speech cannot be truly "free" if wealthy interests are allowed to
drown out other speakers in an untrammeled free market. The right to marry
is, effectively, a right to governmental recognition of a personal
relationship-a right that necessarily requires government to define the
sorts of relationships it will recognize. And debates about the free exercise
of religion are increasingly about rights to have the government take action
to accommodate-not simply ignore-particular beliefs and practices. In
each of these areas, we may not be able to afford a strong, strict-scrutiny-
type standard that presumptively invalidates all governmental intrusion, but
there is sufficient risk of governmental attempts to control protected choice
that we also cannot afford to dispense with judicial review entirely.
One hesitates to advocate expanding undue-burden-type analyses to
these other contexts, given how controversial the standard is even in its
natural habitat.134 My point is simply that the undue burden standard arguably
has two characteristics that will become increasingly important in a post-
double-standard world. First, it is intermediate between tests that strike
almost everything down and tests that rubber-stamp whatever the government
chooses to do. Second, because it holds this middle ground, it is generalizable
to a wide range of circumstances, without needing to divide up the world into
distinct categories triggering distinct analyses. Courts conceivably could
apply this sort of analysis to the full range of government regulation,
upholding those regulations designed to respect and facilitate individual
rights while striking down those with the purpose or effect to interfere.
These advantages come at a cost, however, which is that the undue
burden standard is far more indeterminate than either strict scrutiny or
133. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 877 ("A statute [creating an obstacle to securing an abortion] is
invalid because the means chosen by the State to further the interest in potential life must be calculated
to inform the woman's free choice, not hinder it.").
134. See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, Note, Unburdening the Undue Burden Standard: Orienting
Casey in Constitutional Jurisprudence, 94 COLuM. L. REV. 2025, 2026 (1994) ("[T]he abortion undue
burden standard is virtually unique in its lack of protection against unnecessary and unjustified burdens
on a constitutionally protected right."). For an earlier and much more extensive effort to think about the
undue burden standard as responding to more universal problems in constitutional law, see generally
Alan Brownstein, How Rights Are Infringed: The Role of Undue Burden Analysis in Constitutional
Doctrine, 45 HASTINGS L. J. 867 (1994).
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rational basis review.13 Any form of intermediate scrutiny means that the
initial categorization decision does not decide the case. Judges will have to
actually make case-by-case judgments about which regulations to uphold
and which to strike down, and this means that different judges will come
out differently in ostensibly similar cases.136 If nothing else, the Supreme
Court's undue burden jurisprudence reminds us how difficult it is to apply
such tests in a principled way. An influential school of thought holds that
such indeterminacy-the inability of a doctrine to guide courts so that their
decisions seem consistent and principled to outside observers-fatally
undermined the Lochner-era Court's efforts to enforce both federalism and
economic liberty. That, of course, is why we developed the double standard
in the first place. 3 7
Not everyone is terrified of reviving Lochner. David Bernstein, for
example, recently published a book-length project aimed at "Rehabilitating
Lochner.""'3  Short of that, others have pressed for a somewhat more
vigorous version of rationality review in economic cases. Citing recent
cases like Romer v. Evans and City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,
which both applied rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause
with a somewhat greater than usual "bite" to strike down state legislation,139
Timothy Sandefur argues that "a realistic rationality review need not intrude
upon the ability of legislatures to make legitimate policies. Rather, courts
would do what they already do in cases involving other types of
discrimination: ensure that the legislature is pursuing a genuine and
135. Compare, e.g., Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 921-22 (2000) (striking down
Nebraska's partial-birth-abortion ban), with Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 132-33 (2007)
(upholding the federal partial-birth-abortion ban without overruling Stenberg).
136. Sullivan, supra note 130, at 296 n.9. "If a case is steered at the outset onto a track of
intermediate scrutiny, the result is not predetermined at the threshold. Intermediate scrutiny, as discussed
below, is a balancing mode, whether adopted officially or de facto." Id. (citation omitted).
137. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court 1991 Term-Foreword: The Justices of
Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L REV. 22, 60 (1992).
Bipolar two-tier review did penance for the appearance of naked value choices
that had brought the Court into disrepute in the Lochner era. Thus, in true
categorical fashion, two-tier review generally decides cases through
characterization at the outset, without the need for messy explicit balancing. The
classification at the threshold cuts off further serious debate ....
Id.
138. DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
AGAINST PROGRESSIVE REFORM (2011).
139. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (striking down Colorado's state constitutional
amendment foreclosing state and local laws from protecting gay persons from discrimination as not
rationally related to a legitimate state purpose under the Equal Protection Clause); City of Cleburne v.
Clebume Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 435 (1985) (striking down under rational basis review a local
ordinance that discriminated against the mentally disabled).
928 [Vol. 36:903
HeinOnline  -- 36 Vt. L. Rev. 928 2011-2012
The End of the Constitutional Double Standard
reasonable public policy, rather than protecting insiders against
competition."l40
Unlike Professor Bernstein and Mr. Sandefur, however, I am quite
nervous about reviving Lochner-or anything like it. As our wisest Justice
said of what he perceived as another "backward glance" at reinvigorating
that era of more aggressive judicial review, "we know what happened."l 4 1
Justice Breyer is correct, however, that the Court revived something very
like Lochner in Sorrell, and that this form of intrusive judicial review has
potential application in a broad swath of cases involving economic
regulation of activity that happens to be expressive. We will not serve the
cause of coherence in constitutional doctrine by ignoring the fact that the
old categories are breaking down, even if considerably more work will be
required before we know how to replace them.
CONCLUSION
Under current law, nude dancing is protected expression under the First
Amendment.14 2 As one commentator explains, "[n]ude dancing has the
potential to convey a powerful and particularized message of sexual desire
and availability, as well as a message of appreciation of the nude female
form." 43 But if we accept this, then perhaps the plaintiffs challenging the
PPACA's individual mandate should have asserted a First Amendment claim,
too: "Refusal to buy health insurance has the power to convey a powerful and
particularized message of personal autonomy and self-reliance, as well as a
message of political opposition to the federal government's policy on health
care reform." My point is not to amend the PPACA plaintiffs' complaint, but
rather to show how easy it is to merge the world of "personal" and
"economic" rights, notwithstanding the fact that much of contemporary
constitutional doctrine depends on keeping them separate.
Ever since the Supreme Court's famous "switch in time" in 1937, the
Court has endeavored to stay clear of intervening in disputes about
140. Timothy Sandefur, Equality of Opportunity in the Regulatory Age: Why Yesterday's
Rationality Review Isn't Enough, 24 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 457, 487 (2004).
141. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 608, 615 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting).
142. See City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 289 (2000) (plurality opinion)
("[G]ovemment restrictions on public nudity such as the ordinance at issue here should be evaluated
under the framework . . . for content-neutral restrictions on symbolic speech."); see also id, at 326
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (agreeing that "nude dancing is a species of expressive conduct that is protected
by the First Amendment").
143. Kevin Case, Note, "Lewd and Immoral": Nude Dancing, Sexual Expression, and the First
Amendment, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1185, 1185 (2006).
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economic regulation, while maintaining vigorous judicial scrutiny of
restrictions on "personal" rights. Free speech doctrine has thus been built on
the premise that it would rarely, if ever, intersect with the core regulatory
concerns that prompted the Court's retreat during the New Deal. The recent
decision in Sorrell, however, makes clear that this premise no longer holds.
Increasingly, traditional regulatory regimes will seek to govern activity that
counts as expressive under modem First Amendment jurisprudence, thereby
bringing the two halves of the Court's "double standard" into conflict.
I have not tried to resolve this dilemma in this brief Essay. It is
important simply to recognize, however, that Sorrell was a more difficult
case than either the majority or the dissent fully recognized. That
recognition might help pave the way for an effort to restructure
constitutional doctrine along lines that do not depend on unsustainable
distinctions. Cases like Sorrell are not going to go away, and the effort to
reconcile the two halves of the post-New Deal settlement is likely to
preoccupy the Court for many years to come.
HeinOnline  -- 36 Vt. L. Rev. 930 2011-2012
